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Over 750 domains hijacked in attack on Gandi

Gandi saw 751 domains belonging to its customers hijacked and redirected to malware delivery sites, the French registrar reported earlier this month.

The attack saw the perpetrators obtain Gandi’s password for a gateway provider, which it did not name, that acts as an intermediary to 34 ccTLD registries including .ch, .se and .es.

The registrar suspects that the password was obtained by the attacker exploiting the fact that the gateway provider does not enforce HTTPS on its login pages.

During the incident, the name servers for up up to 751 domains were altered such that they directed visitors to sites designed to compromise unpatched computers.

The redirects started at 0804 UTC July 7, and while Gandi’s geeks had reversed the changes by 1615 it was several more hours before the changes propagated throughout the DNS for all affected domains.

About the theft of its password, Gandi wrote:

These credentials were likewise not obtained by a breach of our systems and we strongly suspect they were obtained from an insecure connection to our technical partner’s web portal (the web platform in question allows access via http).

It’s not clear why a phishing attack, which would seem the more obvious way to obtain a password, was ruled out.

Gandi posted a detailed timeline here, while Swiss registry Switch also posted an incident report from its perspective here. An effected customer, which just happened to be a security researcher, posted his account here.

Gandi says it manages over 2.1 million domains across 730 TLDs.

GoDaddy launches security service after Sucuri acquisition

GoDaddy has revealed the first fruits of its March acquisition of web security service provider Sucuri.

It’s GoDaddy Website Security, what appears to be a budget version of the services Sucuri already offers on a standalone basis.

For $6.99 per month ($83.88/year), the service monitors your web site for malware and removes it upon request. It also keeps tabs on major blacklists to make sure you’re not being blocked by Google, Norton or McAfee.

This low-end offering gets you a 12-hour response time for the cleanup component. You can up that to 30 minutes by taking out the $299.99 per year plan.

The more expensive plan also includes DDoS protection, a malware firewall and integration with a content delivery network for performance.

There’s also an intermediate, $19.99-per-month ($239.88/year) plan that includes the extra features but keeps the response time at 12 hours.

An SSL certificate is included in the two more-expensive packages.

The pricing and feature set looks to compare reasonably well with Sucuri’s standalone products, which start at $16.66 a month and offer response times as fast as four hours.

As somebody who has suffered from three major security problems on GoDaddy over the last decade or so, and found GoDaddy’s response abysmal on all three occasions (despite my generally positive views of its customer service), the new service is a somewhat tempting proposition.

CIRA and Nominum offering DNS firewall

Canadian ccTLD registry CIRA has started offering DNS-based security services to Canadian companies.

The company has partnered with DNS security services provider Nominum to develop D-Zone DNS Firewall, which it said lets customers “block access to malicious content before it can reach their network”.

It’s basically a recursive DNS service with a layer of filterware that blocks access to lists of domains, such as those used by command and control servers, known to be connected to malware and phishing.

It’s a timely offering, given the high-profile WannaCry ransomware which infected hundreds of thousands of unpatched Windows boxes worldwide last month (though I’m not sure this kind of service would have actually prevented its spread).

The CIRA service uses Nominum’s technology but operates at Canadian internet exchange points and appears to be marketed at Canadian customers.

It’s the latest effort by CIRA to expand outside of its core .ca registry business. Earlier this year, it became ICANN’s newest approved gTLD back-end provider after a deal with .kiwi.

Many ccTLD registries are looking outside of their traditional businesses as the increasingly cluttered TLD market puts a squeeze on registration growth.

Massive ransomware attack hits 150 countries, brought down by a domain reg

Kevin Murphy, May 15, 2017, Domain Tech

A massive outbreak of malware on Friday hit thousands of organizations in an estimated 150 countries and had a big impact on the UK National Health Service before being temporarily thwarted by a single domain name registration.

WannaCry, as the malware has been called, targets Windows boxes that have not installed a March security patch. It encrypts files on the hosts it infects and demands money for the decryption key.

The attack is Big News for several reasons.

First, it spread ransomware over the network using a remotely exploitable vulnerability that required no user error or social engineering to install itself.

Second, it hit an estimated quarter-million machines, including thousands at big organizations such as Telefonica, the NHS, Deutsche Bahn and FedEx.

Third, it posed a real risk to human life. A reported 70,000 NHS machines, including medical devices, were said to be infected. Reportedly, some non-critical patients had to be turned away from UK hospitals and operations were cancelled due to the inability of doctors to access medical records.

Fourth, WannaCry appears to have been based on code developed by the US National Security Agency and leaked last month.

All in all, it was an attack the scale of which we have not seen for many years.

But it seems to have been “accidentally” prevented from propagating further on Friday, at least temporarily, with the simple act of registering a domain name.

A young British security researcher who goes by the online handle MalwareTech said he was poring over the WannaCry code on Friday afternoon when he came across an unregistered domain name.

On the assumption that the malware author perhaps planned to use the domain as a command and control center, MalwareTech spent the ten bucks to register it.

MalwareTech discovered that after the domain was registered, the malware stopped encrypting the hard drives it infected.

He first thought it was a fail-safe or kill-switch, but he later came to the conclusion that the author had included the domain lookup as a way to thwart security researchers such as himself, who run malware code in protected sandbox environments.

MalwareTech wrote:

In certain sandbox environments traffic is intercepted by replying to all URL lookups with an IP address belonging to the sandbox rather than the real IP address the URL points to, a side effect of this is if an unregistered domain is queried it will respond as [if] it were registered

Once the domain was registered, WannaCry iterations on newly infected machines assume they were running in sandboxes and turned themselves off before causing additional damage.

MalwareTech was naturally enough proclaimed the hero of the day by many news outlets, but it appears that versions of the malware without the DNS query kill-switch already started circulating over the weekend.

Many are warning that the start of the work week today may see a new rash of infections.

The researcher’s account of the incident can be read in full here.

Hacker hostage crisis at ICANN secret key ceremony! (on TV)

Kevin Murphy, March 24, 2017, Gossip

One of ICANN’s Seven Secret Key-Holders To The Internet got taken out as part of an elaborate heist or something on American TV this week.

In tense scenes, a couple of secret agents or something with guns were forced to break into one of ICANN’s quarterly root zone key signing ceremonies to prevent a hacker or terrorist or something from something something, something something.

The stand-off came after the secret agents or whatever discovered that a hacker called Mayhew had poisoned a guy named Adler, causing a heart attack, in order to secure his position as a replacement ICANN key-holder and hijack the ceremony.

This all happened on a TV show called Blacklist: Redemption that aired in the US March 16.

I’d be lying if I said I fully understood what was supposed to be going on in the episode, not being a regular viewer of the series, but here’s the exposition from the beginning of the second act.

Black List

Botox Boss Lady: Seven keys control the internet? That can’t be possible.

Neck Beard Exposition Guy: They don’t control what’s on it, just how to secure it. All domain names have an assigned number. But who assigns the numbers?

Soap Opera Secret Agent: Key holders?

Neck Beard Exposition Guy: Seven security experts randomly selected by ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.

Bored Secret Agent: Max Adler’s wife mentioned a key ceremony.

Neck Beard Exposition Guy: Yeah, four times a year the key holders meet to generate a master key and to assign new numbers, to make life difficult for hackers who want to direct folks to malicious sites or steal their credit card information.

Botox Boss Lady: But by being at the ceremony, Mayhew gets around those precautions?

Neck Beard Exposition Guy: Oh, he does more than that. He can route any domain name to him.

That’s the genuine dialogue. ICANN, jarringly, isn’t fictionalized in the way one might usually expect from US TV drama.

The scene carries on to explain the elaborate security precautions ICANN has put in place around its key-signing ceremonies, including biometrics, smart cards and the like.

The fast-moving show then cuts to the aforementioned heist situation, in which our villain of the week takes an ICANN staffer hostage before using the root’s DNSSEC keys to somehow compromise a government data drop and download a McGuffin.

Earlier this week I begged Matt Larson, ICANN’s VP of research and a regular participant in the ceremonies (which are real) to watch the show and explain to me what bits reflect reality and what was plainly bogus.

“There are some points about it that are quite close to how the how the root KSK administration works,” he said, describing the depiction as “kind of surreal”.

“But then they take it not one but two steps further. The way the ceremony happens is not accurate, the consequences of what happens at the ceremony are not accurate,” he added.

“They talk about how at the ceremony we generate a key, well that’s not true. It’s used for signing a new key. And then they talk about how as a result of the ceremony anyone can intercept any domain name anywhere and of course that’s not true.”

The ceremonies are used to sign the keys that make end-to-end DNSSEC possible. By signing the root, DNSSEC resolvers have a “chain of trust” that goes all the way to the top of the DNS hierarchy.

Black ListThe root keys just secure the bit between the root at the TLDs. Compromising them would not enable a hacker to immediately start downloading data from the site of his choosing, as depicted in the show. He’d then have to go on to compromise the rest of the chain.

“You’d have to create an entire path of spoofed zones to who you wanted to impersonate,” Larson said. “Your fake root zone would have to delegate to a fake TLD zone to a fake SLD zone and so on so you could finally convince someone they were going to the address that you wanted.”

“If you could somehow compromise the processes at the root, that alone doesn’t give you anything,” he said.

But the show did present a somewhat realistic description of how the ceremony rooms (located in Virginia and California, not Manhattan as seen on TV) are secured.

Among other precautions, the facilities are secured with smart cards and PINs, retina scans for ICANN staff, and have reinforced walls to prevent somebody coming in with a sledgehammer, Larson said.

Blacklist: Redemption airs on Thursday nights on NBC in the US, but I wouldn’t bother if I were you.